China's peaceful rise

Despite widespread fears about China's growing economic clout and political stature, Beijing remains committed to a "peaceful rise": bringing its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace -- a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.

China's peaceful rise was a phrase that was used by officials and scholars in the People's Republic of China (PRC) to describe the country's foreign policy approach in the early 21st century.The term proved controversial because the word 'rise' could fuel perceptions that China is a threat to the established order, so since 2004 the term China's peaceful development  has been used by the Chinese leadership.

The State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a white paper in 2005 defining the China's peaceful development strategy in theory and in practice. It has five chapters:

-China is the largest developing country, and economic development according to globalization is China's main goal. China seeks a multipolar world rather than hegemony, and seeks relations with other countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
-A peaceful international environment is essential for China's development. China's development is a major part of global development, as China has factored in world gains in poverty reduction, and strives to reduce its energy consumption. China's growth has lessened the effects of the Late-2000s recession.
-China will develop according to science. It will develop its domestic market and pave a new path to industrialization that is cleaner, and makes more use of information technology and innovation by exploiting its human capital through education.
-China will remain open to the outside world for trade. It will promote organizations like the World Trade Organization, and support regional integration through institutions like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. It will address trade and exchange rate conflicts on an equal footing with other countries. China will invest abroad and maintain its large labor force and exports for use abroad.
-China will promote "democracy in international relations"; with countries interacting on an equal footing through dialog and multilateralism and not coercion. China will promote the full participation of developing countries in international affairs, and also help them develop themselves. There should be trust and not a "cold war mentality", and arms control and nuclear disarmament should be pursued. China will resolve its remaining border disputes peacefully.

Islamization of Western Europe..!!

                                Islamization of Western Europe

Since 9/11, Western Europe's growing Muslim population has been the focus of debate on issues ranging from immigration policy to cultural identity to security. Several incidents in recent years have increased tensions between Western European states and their Muslim populations: the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks, the 2004 ban of the head scarf coupled with the 2011 ban of the "burqa" in France, the 2005 Paris riots, the 2006 Danish cartoon incident, and several high-profile murders. The July 2011 killing spree in Norway by Anders Behring Breivik, who preached against the“Islamization of Western Europe” (WSJ) and multiculturalism further underscored the deepening tensions on the continent.
Despite signs that Muslims are beginning to succeed in business and academia in countries such as France and Germany, many analysts say most of Western Europe's Muslims are poorly integrated into society. They cite closed ethnic neighborhoods, high crime rates in Muslim communities, calls for use of sharia law in Europe, the wearing of the veil, and other examples as evidence of a conflict with European values. Reacting to the November 2009 vote to constitutionally ban minarets in Switzerland, Oxford University scholar Tariq Ramadan wrote in the Christian Science Monitor: "Over the last two decades Islam has become connected to so many controversial debates ... it is difficult for ordinary citizens to embrace this new Muslim presence as a positive factor." Fears over a possible major demographic shift toward Islam as well as ongoing Muslim assimilation problems highlight the continuing divide between Europe and its Muslim population.
Islamic Populations in Europe
After World War II, Western Europe welcomed a large immigrant labor force to help rebuilding efforts. Later more immigrants were admitted to meet rapid economic growth, allow family reunification, and provide asylum. At first, concerns over the influx of workers from other countries were "largely about race and ethnicity," notes Ceri Peach, a professor of social geography at Oxford University, in a 2007 report (PDF) from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The rise of Islamic regimes after the Iranian revolution in 1979--and more recently the increase in terrorism--has called attention to the fact that many of these immigrants were not only ethnically different but also Muslim.
Western Europe has experienced an increase in immigration from all around the globe in the last decade. The European Union's June 2009 strategy report on immigration shows a total of 18.5 million registered non-EU nationals and an estimated 8 million illegal immigrants living in the European Union. Since the EU does not track statistical data on religion, it is unclear what percentage of these immigrants are Muslim. According to a 2008 Brookings study, the EU countries with the largest percentages of Muslims are France at an estimated 8 percent, Netherlands estimated at 6 percent, Germany at 4 percent, and the United Kingdom at 3 percent of the population. And Muslim populations exceed 20 percent in some major EU cities.
The total Muslim population, including immigrant and native born, in Western Europe is about 20 million of the EU's 500 million residents. Some experts contend the continuing influx of immigration from Islamic countries, along with higher immigrant birth rates and lower native European birth rates, mean Muslims in Western Europe could significantly increase in coming decades. However, the CSIS report says that past estimates of growth in Muslim populations seem to show inconsistencies and should be "treated with great caution," and argues that the speed of population growth "in countries with good data" is less than estimates had suggested.
The largest demographic change could come from Turkey, currently discussing entry procedures with the European Union. That alone would increase the Muslim population in the EU by some 70 million. But Turkey's EU accession is increasingly in doubt, which Justin Vaisse, a fellow for European Studies at the Brookings Institution, says makes speculation about any impacts difficult.
Integration and Alienation
Overall, Muslims face a number of challenges on integration and assimilation:
• Poverty and Segregation. Experts say Muslims in Europe are more likely than the EU general population to be poor and live in segregated, crime-prone neighborhoods, according to a 2007 report from the Centre for European Policy Studies. A 2005 Pew report concludes it appears "that segregation is both natural and problematic." Dalia Mogahed, executive director of Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, points out that similar "to minorities in the United States, where one lives is often dictated by socioeconomic realities (Guardian) rather than cultural preferences." Vaisse concurs, noting he doesn't "know anyone living in the ghetto that wants to be there."
However, other analysts find some Muslims also self-segregate for reasons such as language barriers and different cultural norms, such as prohibitions against drinking. Jocelyne Cesari, a Harvard professor and author of 2004 book When Islam and Democracy Meet, argues in order to protect themselves, some Muslims seek closed communities similar to the Amish community in the United States. She says Europeans need to learn to differentiate between religious "conservatives and Jihadis."
High crime rates and dependency on the social welfare system also contribute to European feelings that there is a Muslim problem. Cesari says many Muslims suffer from the "dysfunctional attitudes" and behaviors of Europe's poor. She points out that the more involved Muslims are with their religion the less likely they will be to participate in behaviors such as truancy, drugs, and criminal activity. But this presents another problem: "What we don't want is the kind of Islam that saves the individual but doesn't help them accommodate to society," she says.
Lack of economic opportunity among poor Muslim populations has also contributed to tensions in recent years. Vaisse points out the 2005 Paris riots had nothing to do with religion and everything to do with jobs and economic opportunity. EU Muslims tend to have high unemployment rates, but it is unclear whether they are significantly higher than non-Muslim ethnic minorities. Unemployment statistics in 2004 for Britain show that other than Indians, unemployment rates for all non-white ethnic groups were generally higher than white ethnic groups. The statistics also showed unemployment rates for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were nearly twice as high as for other minority women. A 2009 report from the Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank focused on counter-extremism issues, says polling of South Asian Muslim women found that unemployment was less because of religion and culture than because of poor job and language skills, and a lack of childcare and confidence.
Some experts believe that middle-class Muslims are much more likely to favor assimilation. For example, a 2007 Pew poll showed Muslims in the United States, whose incomes and education are in line with the general public, "are highly assimilated into American society."
• Religion and Identity. Muslims in Germany, Britain, and France were twice as likely as the general public to consider religion a significant part of their daily lives, according to a 2007 Gallup poll. A Pew 2006 poll shows that Muslims in Europe are much more likely to identify themselves by their religion before their nationality. However, the Gallup poll also shows that religious affinity does not make Muslims less likely to identify with their host countries.
Even some Muslims who aren't particularly religious may be drawn to projecting a strong Islamic identity in response to feelings of isolation and their perceptions of the moral permissiveness of Western culture. Muslim diversity in Europe also means there is no monolithic version of Islam being practiced. Some analysts say since culture plays a large role in how Islam is translated into daily lives, there is hope a stronger Euro-Islam identity will emerge as Muslims continue to grow into European culture. "Muslims in Europe are working hard to try to find ways to educate their own communities and talk about the balance between being Muslim and Western, not Muslim or Western," says Farah Pandith, U.S. envoy to Muslim communities.
• Culture and Democracy. Some argue that Muslim culture is at odds with Europe on issues such as freedom of expression, the rights of women, and the separation of church and state. Financial Times columnist Christopher Caldwell, in his 2009 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West, concludes: "Europe finds itself in a contest with Islam for the allegiance of its newcomers. For now, Islam is the stronger party in that contest, in an obvious demographic way and in less obvious philosophical way."
Caldwell points out the cultural disconnect Islam is causing for Europeans: On the one hand, Europeans expect a strong division between church and state. On the other, Europeans' aspirations for tolerance impede their ability to criticize Islam in the same way they have historically criticized Christianity. There have been numerous cases of Muslims using Europe's hate speech laws to defend against what they consider defamation of Islam. Meanwhile, cases such as the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh (BBC) for his film "Submission," critical of treatment of women in Islam, are considered evidence of intolerance by Muslims toward freedom of expression.
Cesari and Brookings' Vaisse note understanding the line between criticism and bigotry will take time for all Europeans. Cesari contends Muslims need to learn that criticism is part of the democratic process and that the "inability to hear one another" may be the greatest problem of the Euro-Muslim debate. Following the 2005 Danish cartoon incident, which sparked riots in many Islamic countries, Vaisse points out Muslims in Europe largely used legal means to show their displeasure. This, he argues, is a sign Muslims in Europe believe in democratic institutions.
• Discrimination and Bias. A 2006 report from the EU Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia found that Muslims face discrimination in all aspects of life , from housing to employment opportunities to education to cultural practices. For many Muslims, being ethnically different and immigrant is often a greater challenge than their religious differences, says Vaisse. "As Muslims in Europe are overwhelmingly non-white, ongoing racial disharmony naturally impedes integration," wrote Tim Winter , a lecturer of Islamic studies at the University of Cambridge, in 2007.
Anti-Mulim rhetoric seems to be gaining in popularity in mainstream European politics, according to June 2011 report from the EU's commission on racism. "Instead of being a notorious neo-Nazi, the previously unknown Behring Breivik [acused of the 2011 Norway attacks] adheres to an ideology represented in parliaments, even governments," wrote Stockholm-based journalist Lisa Bjurwald. So inflammatory were the campaign posters against the minaret in Switzerland in 2009, they were banned as racist in some Swiss cities.
The attention and vehemance the media and some politicians place on symbolic issues like the minaret and the head scarf foster more alienation in Muslim communities, some analysts say. Muslims have also pointed out the media's double standard, which made much of van Gogh's murder, but was largely silent on the2009 murder of a Muslim woman--dubbed "the veil martyr"--and shooting of her husband in a German courtroom.
Though intolerance is not restricted to one group, Muslims have become an easy target because of terrorism, says Akbar Ahmed, chairman of Islamic Studies at the American University. But he notes bias also flows in the other direction, saying Muslim anti-Semitism in Europe is "constantly on the boil."
• Terrorism and Security. The focus of the debate over Muslim immigration and integration is conjoined with fears of radicalism underscored by terror attacks in London and Madrid and a host of other incidents and arrests. But in some cases, the culprits were European-born and well-assimilated. Julianne Smith, director of the Europe Program at CSIS, argues in the 2007 report  that European countries' approach to terrorism and radicalism fall into three broad categories: integrating Muslim minorities, slowing the recruitment of potential extremists, and seizing and arresting terrorist operatives. Robert S. Leiken, director of the Immigration and National Security Program for U.S.-based Nixon Center, says overall European countries have done a relatively good job at monitoring and controlling terrorism.
A 2005 report from the nonpartisan U.S.-funded Congressional Research Service contends diversity among Europe's Muslim population may help impede a "sharply developed tendency toward radicalism," but warns of the dangers of disaffected Muslim youth. Leiken argues that there are differences in how extremist the Muslim communities across Europe are, withBritain's being the most worrisome .
Policy Implications

Scholars point out that cultural debate over Muslims ignores the profound demographic changes in Europe because of increased immigration from all over the world. "At the very moment Europeans find themselves asking, in a globalizing, migratory world, 'What are our roots?,' 'Who are we?,' 'What will our future look like?,' they see around them new citizens, new skin colors, new symbols to which they are unaccustomed," writes Oxford's Tariq Ramadan. Harvard's Cesari says this "cultural malaise" cannot be blamed on Muslims and instead countries need to "completely rephrase" what European and national identity means. Immigration policy in Europe currently focuses on monitoring illegal immigration and addressing the burden of asylum seekers.
Both Vaisse and Mogahed argue the policy discourse on the best way to integrate Muslims should be shifted from cultural differences to socioeconomic ones. Cesari suggests public schools should teach the Islamic contributions that have led to modern Europe to show that Islam is not as foreign as some perceive. Experts say the media and European politicians need to tone down the rhetoric on Muslims as a group--particularly on terrorists--if there is to be any hope for greater integration and assimilation. Meanwhile, some countries are beginning Imam training programs at universities as a way to promote assimilation. "We have 2,600 mosques in Germany, and I don't know a single imam who has a European education," political scientist Bassam Tibi told Deutsche-Welle. "How can they show the Muslim who live here how to live?"
To monitor radicalism, Leiken says good intelligence within communities is needed and policymakers should learn to make distinctions, not only among Muslims but among Islamist groups, some of which could be helpful in combating terrorism.

New World Order:China-India-America(CIA)

                    New World Order:China-India-America(CIA)
There is no faster route to second-tier great power status than for an actual or aspiring superpower to fight a crippling conflict with another country from those same ranks. Moreover, if history is any guide, the glass ceiling that results is a permanent one: This was the fate of imperial Britain, imperial Japan and Germany -- both imperial and Nazi -- in the first half of the 20th century, and the same was true for Soviet Russia in the second half of the century, despite Moscow's conflict with the West being a cold one. The lesson is an important one for Washington, Beijing and New Delhi to keep in mind in the years ahead, given that the two most likely dyads for major war in the 21st century are America-China and China-India.

Many casual observers will dismiss such concerns as overwrought, even as India bulks up its military with China in mind and China does the same with an eye on America's battle-tested but weary force. If conflict is such a farfetched scenario, then the "CIA" trio -- China, India and America -- is spending a whole lot of money on strategic bluster and posturing at a time when the world at large deserves better from each individually and all collectively. Globalization is still rapidly expanding, unleashing all manner of local instabilities in developing regions that are not yet capable of absorbing its revolutionary embrace. China and India are globalization's lead integrating agents and America its clear policing lead, but actual cooperation among them on running this messy world could be charitably described as embryonic -- and more accurately cast as non-existent.

As for a grand vision in this regard, the Obama administration has offered nothing more than what we suffered through during the Clinton and Bush years: Washington still sees its only serious allies in Western Europe and industrialized Asia. But as NATO's Libyan intervention makes clear, the Western alliance has outlived its strategic coherence. Outside of America, the West isn't having enough babies, and as a result, both our European allies and Japan are now losing workers and stockpiling elders. Meanwhile, their militaries are shrinking, as is their will to fight. Looking ahead to the post-2030 strategic landscape, when the world will be experiencing all manner of resource and environmental stresses, Europe and Japan cannot be considered serious first-tier candidates for superpower status.

As for the BRICS' superpower aspirations, you can rule out South Africa due to its widespread poverty, Russia due to its demographics and Brazil because of its gloriously benign security environment, which offers no impetus for creating a superpower-level military.

That leaves us with the China-India-America trio of million-man militaries and world-leading economies to support them. Yes, that's a crude measure of power at a time when armies are shifting from attrition warfare to system-based strategies, but frankly, drones and precision strikes can only get you so far in settling globalization's vast frontiers. The "boots on the ground" imperative for nation-building won't go away just because America, as a result of its recent myopic applications, has grown tired of the necessary task. Armed with billion-plus national populations, both China and India will instinctively throw bodies at problems, as well they should.

It may seem inconceivable that the former victims of European colonialism in the developing world will accept such an interventionist approach, but in a post-2030 landscape, push will come to shove on a host of global resourcing issues -- starting with energy and food -- where both China and India will suffer great vulnerabilities and dependencies.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that China and India will be able to simply take what they need by force, given their similarly vast needs and their long history of rivalry. Here America will logically act as the offshore balancer across Eurasia and the stabilizing third partner elsewhere.

But the balance of power between the three behemoths will be significantly impacted by some demographic data points. On the subject of labor, rapidly aging China will lose tens of millions of workers by 2030. By contrast, "younger" America will gain a couple dozen million, and truly young India will add well more than 100 million. America will make up for its lack of overall demographic bulk in its per capita income, expected to stand at around $60,000 in 2030, compared to $20,000 for China and $10,000 for India. Yes, America will remain a greatly indebted country, but both China and India will remain tethered to the "ball and chain" that is their impoverished rural poor, which will still be counted in 100-million increments.

Come 2030, the CIA trio will constitute the world's three most powerful national economies and militaries, with no other entity even coming close to first-tier status. In a logical world, these three will nations realize their greatly overlapping strategic interests and cooperate in running the global economic and security system.

But between now and 2030, we will also witness a series of perceived shifts in that trio's rank ordering that will exacerbate the already existing tensions in their bilateral and trilateral relations. Indeed, we are experiencing one right now, with many observers perceiving "rising" China as passing a "declining" America, even if others consider that verdict to be premature. Nevertheless, Washington's eagerness to sell massive amounts of military hardware to anybody in South and East Asia that isn't China is a good example of the dynamic that such shifts in rank-order, whether real or perceived, can create.

This is likely only the first of a trio of perceived power shifts to come. The second will result from a combination of the next "morning in America" moment here in the States and China hitting a cluster of inevitable developmental walls -- environmental damage, demographic aging, resource constraints and political pluralism, among others. And while there might be little real danger of a U.S.-China military conflict today, imagine the potential for confrontation when China's rising nationalism combines with the popular anger resulting from the realization that the "Chinese century" lasted less than a generation.

The third power shift is likely to be even harder for China to swallow: India's pronounced demographic dividend means it will inevitably inherit China's current status as globalization's factory floor. Around 2030, India's labor pool will surpass that of China's, and by 2050 it will become larger by half. At some point along the way, most probably crystallized by some debilitating large-scale crisis in China, India will permanently dethrone China as the new "rising power" in the global narrative. In that process, America will lose some relative standing, but it won't create the same kind of fear in the system because of India's longstanding status as a stable democracy.

There remain two great uncertainties attached to these forthcoming power shifts. First, how will China handle America's resurrection? And second, how will India handle the onset of its recognized "rise" into first-tier superpower status? What is certain, however, is that "hedging" or "containing" China is both a waste of time and likely to backfire over the long term by creating an unnecessary legacy of resentment and suspicion, because demographically speaking, "the fix" is already in.

Instead, in the coming years, Washington should seek to establish a new "trilateral commission" that swaps out Europe and Japan for India and China. That's your "new world order" for you, waiting for the shaping that only the U.S., as the incumbent world superpower, can bring about.(BY:Thomas P.M. Barnett)

Democracy in Danger...!!

Over the past six months, the world has watched as the Middle East, a region that long seemed immune to democratic change, has risen up.
The popular movements in the region have inspired democrats from around the globe. In China, online activists have called for a "Jasmine Revolution" designed to press the Communist Party to open up. While in Africa, reformers have called for their own "African Spring".
But the Arab Spring is, in many ways, a mirage. Several nations in the region may eventually make the transition to democracy - this is hardly assured - but in reality, democracy is faltering throughout the developing world, from Asia to Latin America, from Africa to the former Soviet states.
In its annual survey, the monitoring group Freedom House, which uses a range of data to assess social, political and economic freedoms, found that global freedom plummeted for the fifth year in a row in 2010, the longest continuous decline in nearly 40 years. In fact, there are now fewer elected democracies than there were in 1995.
A mountain of other evidence supported Freedom House's findings. One of the other most comprehensive studies of global democracy, compiled by Germany's Bertelsmann Foundation, uses data examining the ability of democracies to function, manage government and uphold freedoms to produce what it calls the Transformation Index.
The most recent index found "the overall quality of democracy has eroded [throughout the developing world] ... the key components of a functioning democracy, such as political participation and civil liberties, have suffered qualitative erosion ... these developments threaten to hollow out the quality and substance of governance". The index concluded that the number of "highly defective democracies" - democracies with institutions, elections and political culture so flawed that they no longer qualified as real democracies - had roughly doubled between 2006 and 2010.
 The  Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy only further confirmed these findings. The unit analyses democracy using categories for electoral process, pluralism, political participation, political culture, functioning of government and civil liberties. It found that democracy was in retreat around the globe. "In all regions, the average democracy score for 2010 is lower than in 2008," it reported.
In 91 of 167 countries it studied, the democracy score had deteriorated in that time period and in many others it had only remained stagnant. Of the 79 nations that it assessed as having some significant democratic qualities, only 26 made the grade as what the EIU calls "full democracies", while the other 53 were ranked only as "flawed democracies" because of serious deficiencies in many of the areas it assessed.
In Latin America, Africa, Asia and even most of Africa, coups, which had been a frequent means of changing governments during the Cold War, had become nearly extinct by the early 2000s. But between 2006 and 2010, the military grabbed power in Mauritania, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh, Fiji and Madagascar, among others.
In many other developing nations, such as Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines, the military managed to restore its power as the central actor in political life, dominating the civilian governments that clung to power only through the support of the armed forces. "It's almost like we've gone back to the [Ferdinand] Marcos era," prominent Filipino rights activist and lawyer Harry Roque Jr said, as he waited in his office for the security forces to come and interrogate him. "There's the same type of fear, the same abuses, the same attitude by the military that their actions will never face consequences."
Support for democracy has become so tepid in parts of the developing world that many of these coups were cheered: in Niger last year, thousands celebrated the military takeover in Niamey, the capital, in part because the overthrown leader had been destroying the country's democratic institutions.
Overall, an analysis of military coups in developing nations over the past 20 years, conducted by David Silverman, my Council on Foreign Relations research associate, found that in nearly 50 per cent of cases drawn from Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, middle-class men and women either agitated in advance for the coup, or, in polls or prominent media coverage afterwards, expressed their support for the army takeover.

Cyber Security And US-china relations...!!

Author: Adam Segal, CFR

Less than three weeks after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and three other cabinet members announced the International Strategy for Cyberspace, another incident has occurred between the United States and China.


In this instance, Google claims that hackers based in Jinan stole the passwords of the email accounts of senior government officials in the United States and Asia, as well as Chinese political activists. The Chinese response followed the standard script: deny the claims, point out illegality of hacking in China, note that China is also a victim, and question the motivations of Google and the United States. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said, ‘Allegations that the Chinese government supports hacker attacks are completely unfounded and made with ulterior motives’.

While this flare up is likely to be short lived, the two sides involved hold fundamentally incompatible views on cyberspace, which means it is almost inevitable that there will be another incident sometime in the near future. The International Strategy states that the US will promote a digital infrastructure that is ‘open, interoperable, secure, and reliable’ while supporting international commerce, strengthening security, and fostering free expression. At best, China shares interest in two of these goals — global commerce and security — and even in those cases it has a different conception of how they should be defined.

The most visible difference is over the use of the internet and other communications technologies to ensure the free flow of information. Like the Russians, the Chinese are more likely to speak of ‘information security’, which includes concerns about content, rather than ‘cyber security’, which is primarily focused on the protection of communication and other critical infrastructure networks. A July 2010 report from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ‘Development of China’s New Media’, accuses the United States of using Twitter, Facebook, and other social media sites to foster instability. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, Washington provides support for ‘hacktivists’ and others to circumvent the content filters and other technologies that make up the Great Firewall of China and it views this behaviour as benign. The Chinese on the other hand, consider all this to be ‘on a par with the Google hack’. In any discussion about norms in cyberspace, Beijing is likely to demand that the United States limit its support for digital activists, a requirement Washington is unlikely to meet.

As Chinese technology firms expand abroad, they will have a growing stake in a digital infrastructure that is global, interoperable, and secure. But in the near term the Chinese government has used competing national technology and security standards to promote indigenous innovation. The Multi-Level Protection Scheme, for example, requires that banks, government offices, and other critical industries use security technology provided by Chinese firms. If foreign companies want to remain in the market, they must partner with Chinese firms and possibly transfer technology to them.

The more dependent the Chinese economy becomes on the internet, the more vulnerable China becomes, and thus the more likely it becomes that the United States and China can reach some agreement about limits on the development and use of cyber weapons. But for now, Chinese defence analysts clearly believe that America possesses superior capabilities in conventional weapons and that the American military is more dependent on the internet than the People’s Liberation Army. As a result, open source writings are filled with discussions about how cyber attacks can limit US power projection.

It is also worth noting that Chinese officials see a high degree of hypocrisy in US positions. While American policy makers talk about maintaining freedom of movement, Chinese policy makers see a strategy focused on dominance, control, and on limiting China’s ability to act. The list of complaints is long: American companies dominate the hardware and software industries, Internet Corporation for Assigned Networks Names (ICANN) is beholden to the US government, nine of the 12 auxiliary root servers are located in the United States, and US Cyber Command was established in order to conduct offensive operations.

Given these divergent views, US policy makers need to have a realistic sense of what can be accomplished with China in cyberspace. Patience and cool-headedness will be in high demand as the next dispute breaks out. Washington must engage Beijing in discussions about the rules of the road, but more important will be efforts to work with allies and close friends in defining international norms of behaviour.

Less than three weeks after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and three other cabinet members announced the International Strategy for Cyberspace, another incident has occurred between the United States and China.



In this instance, Google claims that hackers based in Jinan stole the passwords of the email accounts of senior government officials in the United States and Asia, as well as Chinese political activists. The Chinese response followed the standard script: deny the claims, point out illegality of hacking in China, note that China is also a victim, and question the motivations of Google and the United States. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said, ‘Allegations that the Chinese government supports hacker attacks are completely unfounded and made with ulterior motives’.

While this flare up is likely to be short lived, the two sides involved hold fundamentally incompatible views on cyberspace, which means it is almost inevitable that there will be another incident sometime in the near future. The International Strategy states that the US will promote a digital infrastructure that is ‘open, interoperable, secure, and reliable’ while supporting international commerce, strengthening security, and fostering free expression. At best, China shares interest in two of these goals — global commerce and security — and even in those cases it has a different conception of how they should be defined.

The most visible difference is over the use of the internet and other communications technologies to ensure the free flow of information. Like the Russians, the Chinese are more likely to speak of ‘information security’, which includes concerns about content, rather than ‘cyber security’, which is primarily focused on the protection of communication and other critical infrastructure networks. A July 2010 report from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ‘Development of China’s New Media’, accuses the United States of using Twitter, Facebook, and other social media sites to foster instability. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, Washington provides support for ‘hacktivists’ and others to circumvent the content filters and other technologies that make up the Great Firewall of China and it views this behaviour as benign. The Chinese on the other hand, consider all this to be ‘on a par with the Google hack’. In any discussion about norms in cyberspace, Beijing is likely to demand that the United States limit its support for digital activists, a requirement Washington is unlikely to meet.

As Chinese technology firms expand abroad, they will have a growing stake in a digital infrastructure that is global, interoperable, and secure. But in the near term the Chinese government has used competing national technology and security standards to promote indigenous innovation. The Multi-Level Protection Scheme, for example, requires that banks, government offices, and other critical industries use security technology provided by Chinese firms. If foreign companies want to remain in the market, they must partner with Chinese firms and possibly transfer technology to them.

The more dependent the Chinese economy becomes on the internet, the more vulnerable China becomes, and thus the more likely it becomes that the United States and China can reach some agreement about limits on the development and use of cyber weapons. But for now, Chinese defence analysts clearly believe that America possesses superior capabilities in conventional weapons and that the American military is more dependent on the internet than the People’s Liberation Army. As a result, open source writings are filled with discussions about how cyber attacks can limit US power projection.

It is also worth noting that Chinese officials see a high degree of hypocrisy in US positions. While American policy makers talk about maintaining freedom of movement, Chinese policy makers see a strategy focused on dominance, control, and on limiting China’s ability to act. The list of complaints is long: American companies dominate the hardware and software industries, Internet Corporation for Assigned Networks Names (ICANN) is beholden to the US government, nine of the 12 auxiliary root servers are located in the United States, and US Cyber Command was established in order to conduct offensive operations.

Given these divergent views, US policy makers need to have a realistic sense of what can be accomplished with China in cyberspace. Patience and cool-headedness will be in high demand as the next dispute breaks out. Washington must engage Beijing in discussions about the rules of the road, but more important will be efforts to work with allies and close friends in defining international norms of behaviour.

Chinies Hacking and scared World..!!

Cyberwarfare in 2011 is an odd beast. Many Western governments reportedly actively monitor rivals and engage in online sabotage, while countries ranging from Israel to Iran to India also engage in cyberwarfare programs of their own. But it's attacks against the American government and commercial websites such as Google that grab headlines.
As foreign governments learn the ease of obtaining intelligence online and foreign corporations continue to get the edge on their competitors through massive online attacks, future hacker efforts will only become more ambitious. One of the countries where many of these civilian and military attacks reportedly originate is China.
Fast Company recently spoke with Adam Segal, the Ira A. Lipman senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security issues at the Council on Foreign Relations, about bored Chinese teenagers, the Chinese way of hacking, India's rush to create a patriotic hacker corps, and much more.
FAST COMPANY: Could you give a short rundown of China's suspected role in cyberespionage of both governments and corporations?
ADAM SEGAL: A number of fairly well-publicized attacks on U.S. governments and corporate interests with codenames like “Titan Rain” have taken place. In many cases, attribution to China is fairly speculative. In the Google case, it was supposedly traced back by IP address but in many cases it's fairly suspect. But they are motivated primarily by espionage reasons--both military and industrial--and also in some cases, by preparing the battlefield. Looking at potential targets that would be used in a military scenario in case there was, in fact, conflict.
As far as preparing the battlefield, do you think it is mostly organized by the government, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and groups like that, or is it just bored kids with some sort of connection to government?
Well, that's the $64,000 question in the Chinese context. The question is who is responsible for these things, even if you trace it back to China, is if they are bored hackers or PLA members or criminals with ties to the PLA or PLA divisions acting criminally? We don't really know. I suspect that the majority of the attacks and espionage on on the criminal side are by patriotic hackers that have some sort of connection, maybe financial, to the PLA or the State Security Ministry. In the cases of power grids and other cases like that, I suspect PLA affiliation, but there is no way to know.
Do you think China, in terms of ideology, differentiates between information security and cybersecurity?
Yes. I think the way that the United States, the United Kingdom, and most other Western countries use it is for defense of computers and communications networks. The Chinese, like the Russians, also use the term “information security,” which includes content. They are not only concerned about attacks on networks, but which information is being carried on them--which could affect national security. The worry is that Twitter, Facebook, and other social networks could be used for political reasons inside China. When you look at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and their statements on information security, they have a big focus on domestic security.
Are many suspected American cyberespionage or cyberwarfare efforts believed to be taking place against China?
I can say that Chinese officials I have spoken to say it's widespread. They basically assume that the National Security Agency (NSA) is in all their networks. They tend to view U.S. companies as instruments of U.S. policy, so they will say we are the political party because they have to rely on Cisco and Microsoft products--and they assume all these products are built with backdoors for the NSA to take advantage of. I suspect that the NSA and U.S. government do conduct some espionage against the Chinese and they have some reason to be apprehensive.
As far as Chinese hackers, is their knowledge mostly homegrown or are they connected to the larger hacker subculture?
I haven't spent much time looking at the hackers, but my sense is that they have some kind of contact with the larger subculture and that they draw on the ethos of it. But, like a lot of things, it has Chinese characteristics. For a long time, we used to speak of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and then “market capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” Now there is “hacking with Chinese characteristics” as well. It draws from the outside but they make it their own.
Do you see any other countries imitating China's cyberwarfare and cyberespionage efforts?
I see a lot of similarities between what is happening in Russia and what is happening in China, with both state and non-state actors among their hackers. Both states find plausible deniability important for strategic and political reasons. In India, there has been a lot of discussion in the press about how the country should have its own patriotic hackers. But with India being a democracy, I think it is harder. However, I think there have been efforts to build those sorts of efforts. But the bigger issue is that many of China's attitudes towards cyberspace more broadly--such as information security vs cybersecurity and being able to control the internet domestically--are all pretty attractive to developing countries. They are offering an attractive ideological model.

Cyberconflict:New World's problem..!!

Cyberconflict--the use of computer power for intelligence gathering or to attack the computer, communication, transportation, and energy networks of states or non-governmental groups--is now a major arena of political, economic, and military contest. Fending off cyberattacks has become a costly preoccupation of governments, corporations, and non-profit organizations. Cyberattacks could ultimately lead to massive financial loss, economic disruptions, or even war.
Despite this potential for harm, little agreement exists on how to respond. One problem is the lack of understanding, especially among policymakers, about how interconnected and vulnerable our increasingly sophisticated computer networks are. Beyond this lies a whole host of thorny analytical questions: What is our ability to track the source of attacks? How susceptible are we to "false flag" attacks where the attackers deliberately seek to "frame" another actor as carrying out an attack? What responsibility should governments bear for attacks carried out by their nationals on foreign governments or entities? How should the responsibility for defending against cyberattacks be apportioned between government and the private sector, between national governments and the international community? Can deterrence work in cyberspace?
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is actively engaged in helping U.S policy makers, business leaders, and the general public better address these and other questions at the nexus of cybersecurity and foreign policy. CFR has hosted some of the most important practioners and thinkers to speak at general meetings and roundtable seminars.
In January 2011, CFR will host a one-day workshop focusing on some of the trade and economic issues involved in cybersecurity including supply chain security and corporate espionage. Future meetings and research will focus on the relationship between cyberwar and the existing laws of war and conflict; how the United States should engage other states and international actors in pursuit of its interests in cyberspace; how the promotion of the free flow of information interacts with the pursuit of cybersecurity; and the private sectors role in defense, deterrence, and resilience.
Five CFR Research Fellows work on cyber issues, and they publish in numerous outlets and comment frequently in the media. And CFR's membership and corporate programs have a unique ability to draw expertise from government, industry, and academia to address an issue that will require greater public-private cooperation, both domestically and internationally.