After HU::China and its forien Policy..!!

In about a year’s time, a new group of leaders in Beijing will succeed President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. At the moment, analysts are focused primarily on the make-up of the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme policy making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, both members of the standing committee now, are assured of succeeding Hu and Wen, respectively. As a result, the guessing game that has engrossed many China watchers is over who will replace the other seven retiring members.


Speculating about top personnel decisions is both risky and not all that interesting. Such decisions are reached through intricate factional bargaining and compromises, and the ultimate outcome is typically not determined until the very end. Worse, handicapping the chances of frontrunners usually distracts us from trying to understand the broader policy implications of leadership transition. We become too preoccupied with the shifting fortunes of factions within the CCP leadership to explore whether leadership change actually affects policy.

So a more fruitful way of getting ourselves prepared for China’s upcoming leadership transition is to look back at history and examine whether the past top leadership changes resulted in significant foreign policy changes, and what explained such major shifts.

Unfortunately, we don’t have a lot of data points here. The CCP has experienced only four leadership transitions: from Mao Zedong to Hua Guofeng (1976), from Hua to Deng Xiaoping (1979), from Deng to Jiang Zemin (1994-95), and from Jiang to Hu Jintao (2002). Of the four cases, only the last three should count because Hua, a transitional figure, didn’t have a real chance to remake Chinese foreign policy.

When we look at the three meaningful leadership transitions, the greatest change in foreign policy occurred when Deng took over power in 1979. He normalized relations with the United States, fundamentally reoriented Chinese foreign policy in a pro-Western direction, ended Chinese support for leftist forces around the world, and launched a punitive, albeit costly, war against Vietnam. In addition, he articulated a new strategic principle: Chinese foreign policy is to serve the country’s economic modernization. (His famous dictum on keeping a low profile was prescribed after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, more than a decade later).

The transition from Deng to Jiang in the mid-1990s didn’t bring about a fundamental shift. (Deng was too ill to influence policy by 1994, even though he didn’t die until 1997). Still, there were minor but important adjustments. Jiang moved China closer to the West and accelerated its integration into the West-dominated international system, culminating in the accession into the World Trade Organization at the end of his tenure, perhaps his most enduring legacy.

Another notable shift under Jiang was China’s regional diplomacy. He upgraded China’s ties with Moscow, and opened China’s charm offensive toward ASEAN nations. But, at the same time, Jiang adopted a tougher stance toward Japan and was blamed for the rapid deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties under his watch. On Taiwan, Jiang initially tried to reach out to Taiwan’s new leader, Lee Teng-hui, but Lee’s turn toward a more pro-independence stance in the mid-1990s forced Jiang to take a much harder line.

Geopolitics of India with ASEAN countries..!!

(BY: Ashley J Tellis)

Some researchers liken China to a rooster, with Korea as its beak and Vietnam its leg. The analogy, while highlighting the strategic importance of Vietnam toward China’s well-being, especially in terms of security, also implies that Vietnam has long been living with the weight of China on its shoulder. The problem is that Vietnam can’t do much about it, even if it wants to.


Just like Cuba to the United States or Georgia to Russia, Vietnam is, in Prof. Carlyle Thayer’s words, condemned to a ‘tyranny of geography,’ whereby it has no choice but to learn to share its destiny with neighbouring China through every twist and turn of its history.

In fact, a stronger China has long been the most serious threat to Vietnam’s security. Vietnam came under Chinese suzerainty for almost a thousand years until 938 A.D. Between then and the French colonization of Vietnam in the latter half of the 19th century, China invaded and occupied Vietnam a couple of times. But the most recent testimony in support of the idea that China is a major source of insecurity has been the brief yet bloody war that China waged along Vietnam’s northern border in 1979, and the naval clash initiated by China in the South China Sea in March 1988.

The threat posed by China toward Vietnam comes not only from geographical proximity, but also the asymmetry of size and power between the two countries. China is, for example, 29 times larger than Vietnam, while Vietnam’s population, despite being the 14th biggest in the world, is roughly equivalent to that of a mid-sized Chinese province.

Vietnam’s impressive economic performance since the late 1980s hasn’t allowed it to close the gap in strength. On the contrary, with China’s modernization over the last three decades, the power gap between the two countries is getting ever wider. For example, according to World Bank data, between 1985 and 2009, China’s GDP in current US dollars expanded by more than 16 times, from $307 billion to $4.985 trillion. Over the same period, however, Vietnam’s GDP increased by only 7 times, from $16 billion in 1985 to $97 billion in 2009.

Thanks to its economic development, China’s military might has also been significantly boosted, posing an even more formidable threat to Vietnam’s security. According to China’s official statements, its military budget for 2011 is $91.5 billion, while Vietnam is said to have allocated only $2.6 billion (about 2.5 percent of its GDP). What’s particularly worrying for Vietnam is that China’s expanded military expense is concentrated on its air force and navy, strengthening China’s capacity to project power into the South China Sea, where China and Vietnam have competing claims.

To make things worse, Vietnam’s transformation toward an open market economy adds another aspect to this tyranny of geography: increased economic vulnerability.

Since Vietnam resumed trade with China in the late 1980s, its domestic production has long been threatened by Chinese goods, which flood the country through both formal trade and smuggling. In the early 1990s, for example, Chinese consumer goods smuggled into Vietnam were so overwhelming and detrimental to domestic production that the Vietnamese government had to impose a ban on 17 categories of goods imported from China. In recent years, despite the enhanced competiveness of Vietnamese products and the perceived poor quality of Chinese ones, smuggling from China is still rampant. This not only exerts a negative impact on Vietnamese domestic production, but also puts Vietnamese consumers at risk, especially when many goods smuggled from China are toxic and harmful to people’s health.

Another vulnerability is Vietnam’s perennial trade deficit with China, which amounted to $5.4 billion out of the country’s total trade deficit of $7.5 billion in the first half of 2011. Moreover, China has emerged as Vietnam’s largest source of imports, accounting for almost a quarter of its import turnover in 2010. Vietnam is heavily dependent on China for input materials for some of its major export industries, such as footwear, garments, textiles or furniture. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s exports to China are just a minuscule portion of China’s total imports. As a result, should China decide to discontinue trade with Vietnam for some reason, the damage to Vietnam’s economy would be immense.

Another concern raised in Vietnam recently has been the fact that Chinese companies have won up to 90 percent of EPC (Engineering/Procurement/Construction) contracts for Vietnam’s major industrial projects, especially those of coal-fired power plants. Chinese contractors are favoured as they offer cheap technology and promise to help arrange financial funding from Chinese banks. Cheap as it seems, though, Vietnam in fact pays dearly for these contracts.

I am going to (deal with) the subject of “India in Asian Geopolitics” because I want to spend some time focussing on some structural features of the security environment that faces India across the widest possible canvas. I must give you two warnings, however, before I launch into the substance of my presentation. First, I am not going to speak as an American citizen, but merely as an analyst of international politics. I do this because I want to escape the question of my own political commitments in order to better reflect on what I think is a serious problem that confronts both the United States and India together.
Secondly, I want to make what is fundamentally an academic presentation because it is the best means by which to draw out some important policy consequences. I emphatically do not want to make a conventional “policy” presentation, because that risks proffering essentially a mask that covers my own personal opinions and prejudices. I will end this presentation, certainly, by giving you a flavour of my prejudices. But I will keep that for the end. For the body of my lecture, I want to focus on the substance of what I think is the central challenge of geopolitics today.
I will divide my presentation into four parts:
The first part will reflect on the current geopolitical environment in Asia and how it is evolving. The second part will describe the current American response to this geopolitical environment. The third part is going to explore the contours of a world that we have not seen before. And, the fourth part will ask the question of what all this means for India and for the United States.
Geopolitical Environment
Let me start by briefly saying a few words about the current geopolitical environment in Asia. If you look at the literature on the prospect of geopolitical changes, you will find that it is rife with all manner of predictions about the onset of multipolarity-that somehow the current international system is going to become multipolar shortly and that the world as we know it today will before long evolve into a new universe of multiple poles.
My own view is that this argument is profoundly mistaken. The international political system is likely to stay, quite durably, a unipolar system for a long time to come: that is, for at least another twenty or so years, if the statisticians are to be believed. But this reality is going to manifest itself in a world where the centre of gravity is shifting from where it has traditionally been for the last 500 years-Europe-to Asia. Asia will produce close to half, if not half, of the world’s economic product by 2025-this is the real emergent change in international politics-but, despite this fact-and this is the element of continuity-the United States will remain the dominant power in the international system for the foreseeable future.
There are four virtuously interacting reasons that assure the continuing pre-eminence of the United States.
The first reason is that, despite all the skepticism on this score, the United States has demonstrated a capacity to maintain continuing high rates of capital accumulation through a mixture of internal and, more importantly, external resources. The United States is in the very lucky position where the rest of the world is eager to provide it with the financial resources that enable it to sustain its profligate way of life. This is because the dollar still remains the most important global reserve currency and because, at the end of the day, the rest of the world, no matter what its complaints are about the United States, sees the United States as a very desirable destination to park its resources. Furthermore, America’s most important trading partners seem embarked on externally-driven growth strategies, which make Washington an even greater beneficiary of their desire to invest in the United States. So even though the United States does relatively poorly in terms of internal capital accumulation, it manages to compensate for these deficits through disproportionate access to the resources of others.
There is a second reason which enables the United States to stay at the peak of the international system, and that is its continued ability to sustain labour force growth. For those who have survived the fundamentals of neo-classical economics, you will recognise that I am referring to “capital plus labour,” which is the magic formula for producing growth. If the United States can continue to import capital from abroad and can continue to maintain the growth of its labour force, if necessary through the immigration of high-value labour at very low political cost, it will have succeeded in meeting the minimal requirements for sustained economic growth. The United States has many advantages here, which few others do. It must be remembered that this is a country of immigrants; it is not threatened by immigrants; it welcomes immigrants and continues to welcome immigrants; all of which essentially implies that the United States can tap into the two great reservoirs that continue to assure its productivity and its pre-eminence.
The third reason is that the United States continues to maintain a very highly effective national innovation system. It maintains this innovation system primarily because it relies on a market economy to make efficient allocation decisions. Further, its large pool of skilled and innovative labour continues to generate numerous inventions and a steady stream of innovation. Equally importantly, the large American private sector and the government contribute very large investments in science and technology and research and development, and the country enjoys a very flexible and highly effective venture capitalist system.
And so between a political structure that essentially permits decisions to be made smartly, a private-public partnership that invests heavily in research and development and science and technology, and a venture capitalist system that produces investible resources to sustain a steady stream of technical change, the United States has an innovation system that clearly is second to none anywhere in the world.
The final element is US military capabilities, which are unparalleled and growing. Anyone who has followed the debates in Europe about America’s military capability relative to the capacity of our NATO allies, recognises the fact that the gap in technical sophistication between the United States and Europe is actually widening in terms of conventional precision strike capabilities and the ability to deploy sustainable power projection at long-range. Now, this does not mean that the United States can use its military forces indiscriminately or without blowback. It simply means that the United States has incredible advantages with respect to projecting power and, with it, come greater degrees of political autonomy. Perhaps, the most remarkable element is that the United States maintains these capabilities through a defence budget that is larger than the defence budgets of at least the next fifteen countries in the international system put together, and yet these defence burdens are only about 3% of US GNP.
All these four elements working together – capital accumulation, labour force growth, innovation and military capacity – essentially ensure that in a structural sense, the United States will continue to dominate the international system in the policy-relevant future. This implies that there is no imminent threat to American power, since the most important economic powers in the system are essentially friends or allies of the United States: Japan and South Korea in Asia, and all the NATO/EU countries in Europe.
Despite this being the case, however, there is no way to avoid the other half of the story: the prospect of new rising powers in the international system, which will continue to remain a matter of concern to the United States. It is in this context that the rise of Asia poses special opportunities and special challenges. It offers special opportunities because it allows the United States to grow and profit from Asian prosperity. But it offers specific challenges as well insofar as it harbours the prospect that certain key Asian states, which continue to grow over a long period of time, could one day become challengers of the United States in the global system. There are four candidates for this role: Russia, Japan, China and India. When you separate the wheat from the chaff, however, it all boils down to just two countries, China and India. The following are the reasons why:
Russia has great latent capacity, but poor social organisation. It has a very weak state and it has terribly predatory elites. The Russians have not made the kinds of investments in national capacities that are necessary to sustain a great power role, and though they continue to have significant technological capabilities, these resources are actually diminishing in terms of long-term investment. And so Russia is likely to end up being a major supplier of primary and military goods, but not a serious geopolitical challenger to the United States as the Soviet Union was in the past.
Japan in contrast has great technical, financial and social-organisational capacity, but a very poor resource and demographic base. The situation confronting Japan today is the same that confronted it prior to 1941: its dependence on an international market for raw materials, energy, and revenue generation limits its capacity for autonomous action. And the experience of the Second World War demonstrated to the Japanese that any attempt to dominate the international system on its own-unconnected to the United States-will be an effort that ends in disaster.
And so we end up with essentially two great countries, China and India. Both are large continental-size states that are latent great powers, but both are still developing in terms of their technical and social-organisational capacities. These are certainly rising powers, but it is important to recognise that their ability to challenge the United States must not be exaggerated.
To begin with, all predications about China overtaking the United States, even in the out years, rely greatly on contestable assumptions or favourable measurements. Further, China, like Japan, is excessively dependent on the international market both for resources and revenue generation, thus limiting its ability to play the challenger at least in the prospective future. Finally, the continuing contradictions in China’s effort to create a market economy married to a command polity leaves us with some uncertainty as to whether the Chinese experience of high growth can be sustained over the long term.
When one looks at China and India together, therefore, there is a clear recognition within the United States that there are sharp differences between these two countries. There is a recognition that China, which is growing more rapidly than India, exhibits a more determined “will to power,” and that makes the task of integrating China into the international system a far more difficult challenge than that involving India. Moreover, China and the United States are actually locked into military competition: India and the United States clearly are not. And finally there is that business, the squishy but important business, of values. India and the United States are tied together by a commitment to democratic politics which changes the character of the relationship between our two countries in very dramatic and fundamental ways.
Where does all this leave us? I think it leaves us with three important bottom lines when one thinks about the future geopolitical environment. First, there is no country in Asia at the moment that is close to becoming a consequential geopolitical challenger of the United States, at least where control of the global system is concerned. But such a threat could arise over the long term, and if such a threat does arise, most people would bet that it would emerge from China rather than from Russia, Japan or India. Second, even though there is no true peer competitor that is likely to arise in Asia in the near-term, the United States must be cognizant of the challenges that can be mounted by less-than-comprehensively powerful states. The Soviet Union is the best example in this regard. The Soviet Union was always a unidimensional superpower. And there is no guarantee that, in the future, the United States might not be confronted with another unidimensional superpower. The fact is, whether we like it or not, there is a prospect- not a certainty, but a prospect-of an emerging power transition involving China. And, therefore, dealing with the prospect of a power transition will be the most consequential challenge for the United States in the coming century, even though American dominance is likely to endure for the next two decades.
The American Response
Having said all this by way of a baseline, let me go to the second part of my presentation: How should the United States respond to this challenge? There are three models in international politics that one could imagine as vying for dominance in US policy. The first is the classical realist model associated with Niccolo Machiavelli and his prescriptions in the commentaries on the ten books of Titus Livy. Machiavelli has a very simple solution for dealing with prospective power transitions. He says that when a state is faced with such a challenge, there is only one solution that successful regimes have used historically and that solution is preventive war. And he gives the example of the Romans attacking Greece long before the Greeks were actually strong. Because he says to the Romans who were masters “at seeing inconveniences from afar,” and in recognising that delay only brings more perils, were justified in attacking Greece earlier rather than later. So that is the classical realist prescription: undermine the growth of your rivals by preventive war if necessary.
The second model is the conventional realist model, the model associated with George Kennan and implemented during the Cold War, and that is the strategy of comprehensive containment. This model, in effect, declares: Don’t attack your adversaries; don’t undermine them; don’t try to destroy them, because doing so is costly. Instead, create an iron fence which prevents them from creating trouble for you in any way possible. This is an interesting and attractive ideal, but it has limitations. Its greatest limitation is that it is extremely hard to build a containing coalition when the threat is only prospective and not actual, when the threat is only latent and not imminent.
The third model is the liberal internationalist model, which is associated with Immanuel Kant on the one hand and Norman Angell on the other. The liberal internationalist model essentially asserts that the way to deal with rising powers is either to democratise them, because democracy ensures the creation of pacific union and the absence of war, or Norman Angell would say, increase their economic interdependence because economic interdependence increases the costs of conflict to the point where war becomes impractical.
These three ideas, in various forms, have populated the American debate. And yet none of these three solutions offers self-sufficient strategies for dealing with the challenges we face. And so, what I think the United States has done is to marry both realism and liberalism in another classic example of American exceptionalism, in the process crafting a strategy that has not been followed before. And I’ll say a few words about what makes it so unique. The core of the strategy, fundamentally, is not to push China down but rather to engage it, while simultaneously investing in increasing the power of other states located on its periphery. So unlike the classical realist prescription of undermining China’s growth or the conventional realist prescription of containing it, the core of American strategy has been to engage China, not undermine it, but even as Washington engages Beijing, (it is trying) to build a new set of relationships aimed at increasing the power of various countries located along China’s borders. This is indeed a unique solution. When the Bush administration announced in March 2005 that the United States was now committed to encouraging the growth of India as a great power, there was a good deal of sceptical commentary both in the United States and in India about the novelty of this strategy-because it had never been implemented in this form before. And the critics were right on one count: it has not been the norm historically. But there is a reason why it has not been a favoured strategy in the past-and that is because, in a world that was not tightly interdependent before, containment in various forms was simply cheaper than the current alternative. I will focus more on this issue in the third part of my presentation. But, for the moment, let me just end this second part of my talk by simply laying out for you what the other component parts of the current American strategy are.
The first element, as I mentioned, is to focus on engaging China, not undermining it, while simultaneously strengthening others. The second element is to protect America’s capacity for continued innovation, since it is the capacity to innovate that ultimately makes the United States the most important actor in international politics. The third element is to build and preserve the technological basis for maintaining enduring military superiority, and particularly uninterrupted US access to Asia. And, the fourth and final element is to keep our existing alliances in Asia in good repair, while reaching out to new friends and new partners, of which the single most important exemplar for this administration, and likely for every successive administration, will be India.
The critical question, when one looks at this prospectively, is whether this American strategy will be a transitory strategy that evolves into something else or whether it is likely to become a new permanent equilibrium that exists with some durability.
This concern takes me to the third part of my presentation, which is to ask why the United States has adopted such a peculiar strategy. What are the features of the emerging strategic environment that justify the current US approach to managing potential rivalry? This third part of my presentation is really an effort to convey a sense of how we are moving into a global environment.
Exploring the New Contours
Let me start by pointing out what has not changed in international politics. What has not changed in international politics is the fact that relations between states will always remain competitive. That much has not changed. Both Kautilya in the East and Thucydides and Machiavelli in the West have testified to this invariant quality of international politics. The responses of states to international competition have also not changed. All states, when faced with inter-state competition, have responded through a combination of internal balancing, that is, increasing their own resources from within, and external balancing, that is, creating alliances to deal with the emerging threat. This too is abiding. All history is littered with repeated occurrences of these behaviours. However, these strategies worked effectively in the past because what defined the international system previously was the reality of economic autarky. States were essentially not dependent on others for the production of their own prosperity: their interdependence extended to, at most, integration with their allies. And so, all countries were basically more or less self-sufficient universes. The bulk of their economic capabilities, the bulk of their military capabilities, all derived mainly from their own internal capacities-or, at best, through reliance on their allies. In this kind of a universe, you could afford to have strategies that were essentially or purely competitive. You could afford to have strategies that focused on solely on containment, on even on eliminating threats to yourself-in other words, purely competitive strategies.
What has now changed in international politics is this reality called globalisation. This is a phenomenon, which although it has had some reflections in the past, is for most part substantially new. In fact, most scholars agree that what is currently underway is the third wave of globalisation but there is absolutely no doubt that this wave of globalisation is unlike any other that has gone before. How so? It is unlike any other because for the first time in history, economic integration-that is, the comprehensive vertical integration of production and distribution chains-is occurring across the boundaries of states that are nominally geopolitical competitors. Therefore, for the first time in our collective memory, the success of a country in accumulating national power is now dependent not simply on how well it mobilises national resources to create appropriate defensive capabilities vis-à-vis a competitor, or how well it mobilizes national resources through economic integration within its friends, but how well it can generate national resources from the economic relationship it enjoys with a competitor-even as it prepares to use those very resources generated from economic interdependence to cope with the geopolitical rivalry that exists with that competitor.
This is what makes the geo-political environment so different from anything that has gone before. And the two great iconic models are the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the old days, and the prospective relationship between the United States and China in the future. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were two separate universes that had no economic connections with one another. Nothing could be more different than the case of the United States and China in the future: if there is to be serious rivalry in this dyad, it will be a rivalry that is deeply embedded in the larger matrix of economic interdependence. It is precisely this reality of interdependence, which is unlikely to disappear any time soon, which justifies the American adoption of the novel strategy that I described a few moments ago. Let me give you an example that is closer to home. Think of the relationship between India and China during the Cold War, where both countries existed in separate universes, and the relationship that is likely to emerge between India and China in the future, where even if Sino-Indian relations were to degenerate into active competition in some dimensions, it is most likely that this rivalry will be deeply embedded amidst growing economic ties. This means that a globalised world is going to be a very peculiar world. And, the key distinguishing characteristic of this universe will be that a state’s economic relations with its rivals will have a critical effect on its ability to produce the political, economic, and military power needed to defend its strategic interests against those very adversaries.
There are important consequences flowing from this fact. Among the most important is that globalisation weakens the traditional concept of what it means to be a political rival. And it undermines the traditional solutions that all states have used historically for dealing with their rivals. The reason this is so is because states are trying to maximise two goals simultaneously, “power” and “plenty.” What they need to do to maximise power, however, requires them to jointly pursue with their rivals strategies for securing plenty. And these strategies, in turn, might only deepen the rivalry between these states as each seeks to simultaneously maximise its power. Given that this is the reality we are confronted with, and are likely to be confronted by for at least the next twenty to thirty years, I want to conclude by addressing the fourth part of the outline I had referred to earlier: what does this mean for India (and for the United States)?
India-US Dilemma
The most important point I want to make in this regard is that we are entering a new and complex era. We are confronted prospectively by two open geopolitical futures. The first is a world where security competition grows, but is embedded in economic relationships that become ever tighter. This leads to an attenuation of the threats, but the threats never quite disappear. There is, however, an alternative world where the globalisation of the last fifty years simply collapses because of some event that taxes the adjustment capacity of the international system, as previous episodes of globalisation did-and we end up essentially in a new phase of more or less traditional geopolitical competition or another Cold War. These are the two universes that confront us: a future where what we see as the years go by will be a deeper variation of what we see in the present, or a breakdown in the current trends and their replacement by new forms of acute competitiveness. The problem from the viewpoint of policymaking in India and the United States is that we do not know which of these two futures will eventually win out. And therefore we confront two specific problems: how do we make sound strategic policy when we do not know which future is going to materialise? And second, how do we avoid the problem of self-fulfilling prophecies, where in an effort to protect our security we may end up undermining our economic growth, or in our effort to protect our prosperity we end up increasing our own geopolitical vulnerability?
This is the dilemma that confronts both India and the United States. And I have some bad news for you here. This dilemma is fundamentally insoluble because the simultaneous maximisation of power and plenty is, strictly speaking, impossible in a globalised world. Therefore, when people say that India should maintain its highest rates of economic growth, and acquire the most effective military capabilities possible, and deepen its relationships with friendly states in the international system, this is sound advice-no question about it. But, the challenge will lie in implementing such advice because, in the current international system, all bilateral relations between the great powers (and I include India in my definition of great powers), are going to be in a state of continuous, reflexive, and omni-directional re-equilibration. This dynamic of perpetual motion will obtain because any improvement in the character of the relationships within a given dyad will provoke competitive effort at improving relations by other states with each member of the original dyad because no one wants to be left out of what is an emerging virtuous circle. Since this process, however, will always produce uncertainties about who is gaining and by how much, and to what ends these gains are oriented, the dynamism of this process will always become hostage to competing pulls and to alternating bouts of integration and dissipation.
In this context, how does one pursue sound policies when the differences between friend and competitor are defined not by type but only by degree? And how does India pursue an optimal strategy when the very forces that increase its prosperity could also contribute towards increasing the dangers that confront it? This question is particularly relevant because interdependence not only increases the wealth and welfare of all partners but also increases their material capability to harm one another. Since there is no solution that allows a country to secure all the benefits that accrue to prosperity while simultaneously minimising all the threats that ensue from growth, India is likely to face continuing tension as it works out its national security policies amidst the growing realities of interdependence over the next few decades. I want to flag, in this regard, three particular sets of tensions that are very important for us to appreciate.
First, India, like the United States, will not have the freedom to pursue simple and clear strategic policies, but only complex and ambiguous ones. This is going to drive many people crazy because policies that are characterised by subtlety will leave no single constituency, domestic or foreign, completely satisfied. These policies will invariably be policies of the “second-best,” where the most a country can do is to “satisfy” not “maximise” its objectives. This reality will apply as much to India as it will to the United States.
Second, India, like the United States, has to perform a delicate juggling act which involves developing deep and collaborative ties with a set of friends that are likely to be of the greatest assistance to itself, while at the same time seeking to pursue some minimal levels of interdependence with its competitors. And while interdependence with its competitors is important, because of the need to give one’s competitors a stake in one’s prosperity, developing stronger ties with one’s friends becomes even more important. This hinges, of course, on a very sophisticated judgment of who has the capacity and who has the intention to levy the greatest harm. And when one’s friends and enemies are arrayed by these criteria, it is likely that they will be distinguished not by distinct differences of category but rather by location across a spectrum. And India, like the United States, will have to make its strategic decisions based on where its partners stand along that spectrum. There is a canon of sound geopolitics that still applies in this context: those who are the most powerful and the furthest away can be one’s best friends. The implications of this proposition ought not to be lost sight of in India.
Third, India, like the United States, will need to develop the organisational and the psychological capacity for diplomatic, political and strategic agility because an increasingly globalised world will confront both countries with the need for perpetual flexibility, reflected in continual, albeit incremental, course corrections. Because neither country is going to have the luxury of pursuing policies that are utterly transparent or completely straightforward-as would be the case if a Cold War was inevitable-both New Delhi and Washington will have to develop the institutional and psychological capacity to move deftly. Whether India can develop these traits and domesticate them remains to be seen. But the next two or three decades-while the global system is still in evolution and while the United States continues to dominate it while remaining a friend-will provide ample opportunities for India to put these capacities in place.
Let me say one other thing. Political agility is highly prized by diplomats. It is absolutely detested by democracies, because democracies want certainty, stability, and consistency of policy so as to meet the test of public legitimisation. And both India and the United States thus have a common challenge, of developing the capacity for strategic agility, the ability to move quickly and responsively to changing interests, despite the fact that there will be a wide variety of public constituencies constantly calling the political leadership in both countries to the bar to explain the rationale for these “constant shifts of policy.”
Let me end by putting my personal prejudices on the table as I promised I would at the beginning of this presentation. I did not want to make this lecture yet another invocation for the necessity of a strong US-India relationship because I have done that many times in the past. What I hoped to do was to describe the character of the international environment in such a way that it would leave you with no choice but to draw the conclusion that a tight US-India relationship is very much in both our interests. I hope I have succeeded in that purpose.

Vietnam and its geostrategic location...!!

Some researchers liken China to a rooster, with Korea as its beak and Vietnam its leg. The analogy, while highlighting the strategic importance of Vietnam toward China’s well-being, especially in terms of security, also implies that Vietnam has long been living with the weight of China on its shoulder. The problem is that Vietnam can’t do much about it, even if it wants to.


Just like Cuba to the United States or Georgia to Russia, Vietnam is, in Prof. Carlyle Thayer’s words, condemned to a ‘tyranny of geography,’ whereby it has no choice but to learn to share its destiny with neighbouring China through every twist and turn of its history.

In fact, a stronger China has long been the most serious threat to Vietnam’s security. Vietnam came under Chinese suzerainty for almost a thousand years until 938 A.D. Between then and the French colonization of Vietnam in the latter half of the 19th century, China invaded and occupied Vietnam a couple of times. But the most recent testimony in support of the idea that China is a major source of insecurity has been the brief yet bloody war that China waged along Vietnam’s northern border in 1979, and the naval clash initiated by China in the South China Sea in March 1988.

The threat posed by China toward Vietnam comes not only from geographical proximity, but also the asymmetry of size and power between the two countries. China is, for example, 29 times larger than Vietnam, while Vietnam’s population, despite being the 14th biggest in the world, is roughly equivalent to that of a mid-sized Chinese province.

Vietnam’s impressive economic performance since the late 1980s hasn’t allowed it to close the gap in strength. On the contrary, with China’s modernization over the last three decades, the power gap between the two countries is getting ever wider. For example, according to World Bank data, between 1985 and 2009, China’s GDP in current US dollars expanded by more than 16 times, from $307 billion to $4.985 trillion. Over the same period, however, Vietnam’s GDP increased by only 7 times, from $16 billion in 1985 to $97 billion in 2009.

Thanks to its economic development, China’s military might has also been significantly boosted, posing an even more formidable threat to Vietnam’s security. According to China’s official statements, its military budget for 2011 is $91.5 billion, while Vietnam is said to have allocated only $2.6 billion (about 2.5 percent of its GDP). What’s particularly worrying for Vietnam is that China’s expanded military expense is concentrated on its air force and navy, strengthening China’s capacity to project power into the South China Sea, where China and Vietnam have competing claims.

To make things worse, Vietnam’s transformation toward an open market economy adds another aspect to this tyranny of geography: increased economic vulnerability.

Since Vietnam resumed trade with China in the late 1980s, its domestic production has long been threatened by Chinese goods, which flood the country through both formal trade and smuggling. In the early 1990s, for example, Chinese consumer goods smuggled into Vietnam were so overwhelming and detrimental to domestic production that the Vietnamese government had to impose a ban on 17 categories of goods imported from China. In recent years, despite the enhanced competiveness of Vietnamese products and the perceived poor quality of Chinese ones, smuggling from China is still rampant. This not only exerts a negative impact on Vietnamese domestic production, but also puts Vietnamese consumers at risk, especially when many goods smuggled from China are toxic and harmful to people’s health.

Another vulnerability is Vietnam’s perennial trade deficit with China, which amounted to $5.4 billion out of the country’s total trade deficit of $7.5 billion in the first half of 2011. Moreover, China has emerged as Vietnam’s largest source of imports, accounting for almost a quarter of its import turnover in 2010. Vietnam is heavily dependent on China for input materials for some of its major export industries, such as footwear, garments, textiles or furniture. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s exports to China are just a minuscule portion of China’s total imports. As a result, should China decide to discontinue trade with Vietnam for some reason, the damage to Vietnam’s economy would be immense.

Another concern raised in Vietnam recently has been the fact that Chinese companies have won up to 90 percent of EPC (Engineering/Procurement/Construction) contracts for Vietnam’s major industrial projects, especially those of coal-fired power plants. Chinese contractors are favoured as they offer cheap technology and promise to help arrange financial funding from Chinese banks. Cheap as it seems, though, Vietnam in fact pays dearly for these contracts.




First, cheap technology brings pollution. Some reports have suggested that some technologies offered by Chinese companies have been discharged or banned by China since 2005. Second, Chinese contractors’ technical capabilities are limited, causing projects to be delayed or, even when the projects are completed on time, leaving project owners with expensive maintenance bills. Third, as Chinese contractors refuse to use locally available products and instead import everything from China, including basics such as washers, Vietnam’s trade deficit with China soars. Chinese contractors even illegally bring in Chinese labourers at the expense of Vietnamese workers, something that has prompted public outrage in Vietnam.

Another recently exposed economic vulnerability for Vietnam vis-à-vis China is related to Chinese merchants buying massive quantities of Vietnamese agricultural products, ranging from lychee and cassava to aquaculture products and pork. This has caused food prices to surge in Vietnam, and despite the government’s desperate efforts to curb inflation, it climbed to 20.8 percent in June.

These economic vulnerabilities present Vietnam with another perceived threat in addition to the more visible military one. Should China decide to wage an ‘economic war,’ Vietnam would suffer disastrously.

Yet Vietnam seems to have few options for dealing with the economic vulnerabilities it faces over China. On the one hand, any possible reaction will likely be constrained by the fact that Vietnam now has to observe international trade and investment rules, such as those set down by the World Trade Organization, to which Vietnam became a member in early 2007. But Vietnam would anyway have to be wary about massive retaliation should it move to counter China.

Of course there is a possible flipside. Vietnam hopes that growing, though asymmetrical, economic interdependence will help to reduce the possibility of China taking militarily aggressive action against Vietnam, especially in the South China Sea. And, although there are drawbacks to depending on China, Vietnamese businesses still find it much cheaper and more convenient to work with its looming neighbour than with other comparable partners.

As a result, Vietnam is still keen to do business with China, and will continue to try to reap the most it can from its northern neighbour’s booming economy. But as an old Vietnamese saying goes, honey does kill flies. It’s therefore essential that Vietnam stay fully aware of the potential threat, and work on possible strategies to at least neutralize the economic aspects of the tyranny of geography that the country is increasingly suffering from.

Contemporary South Asia and East Asia:China encircles India subcontinent

While US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been visiting India this week, US ties with Pakistan have taken a new, downward twist with the decision by the US Justice Department to charge two men with being in the pay of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.

The last few months have been tumultuous for US-Pakistan relations, with the recent halting of $800 million* in military aid marking a new low. And, as Pakistan looks for support elsewhere, it seems inevitable that China will be waiting in the wings to capitalise on the spat. All this raises the question of how Clinton’s hosts will cope with the China-Pakistan alliance at a time when Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are all already being slowly drawn into China’s orbit.

But back to the US decision for a moment – was it a strategic mistake to push Pakistan toward China with the aid suspension announcement? From a domestic political perspective, with the United States embroiled in a partisan budget battle, the Obama administration may have had little choice – US taxpayers are understandably reluctant to keep sending vast sums of money to a government that has proved ineffective at best, and duplicitous at worst. That Osama bin Laden was able to take refuge for so long in Pakistani territory was perhaps the final straw. Still, the rank and file Pakistani military will no doubt see the suspension of aid as an affront at a time when they are fighting bloody battles in Waziristan as part of what many of them perceive as ‘America’s War.’


China, without the same domestic pressures (or economic constraints, one might add) that the United States faces at the moment, is able to offer a shoulder for Pakistan to cry on. As the Pakistani prime minister recently noted, China is an 'all-weather friend' – he didn’t add ‘not like those fickle Americans,’ but that was clearly the implication.

Of course the current tensions between the United States and Pakistan aren’t what first sparked Pakistan into drawing nearer to China. As The Financial Times noted in a fascinating piece recently, there have been numerous ongoing efforts by China to deepen its relationship with Pakistan militarily and politically: dam construction on sensitive river systems, Chinese construction of the Arabian Sea port at Gwadar, increased sales of military hardware to Pakistan and (perhaps most sensitive for India) claims by the Indian military that Chinese troops are stationed along the Kashmiri Line of Control.

All of this has significant implications for the future of US-Pakistan relations, and a Pakistan less reliant on the United States must make India extremely nervous. China now stands as a clear rival to Indian influence in Nepal, where it has built major cross-border highways from Tibet, and is in the process of extending its rail network to Kathmandu. The same is true of Bangladesh, where China is assisting in the development of a deep-sea port at Chittagong. In Sri Lanka, that other Indian backyard, China is now the country’s largest aid donor, and is helping to build a major new port terminal at Hambantota. And, as the West has put pressure on India to be firmer with the military junta in Burma, China has enjoyed free rein there.

India may be holding the US ever-closer, but it can’t be pleasant to watch itself slowly, but surely, encircled. And while the United States may seek to improve its relations with India, it faces its own economic and military limitations on the extent to which it can influence events in South Asia.

India now accounts for 9 percent of global arms purchases, and has increased its defence budget by around 11 per cent year on year. It’s a trend that a wary Delhi is likely to continue.

*Corrected from $800 billion.

South Asia and NUclear War.....!!

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has just concluded a visit to China on a trip that attracted particular attention because of Beijing’s contentious plan to sell two nuclear reactors to Pakistan.

There’s nothing new about Zardari visiting China—in fact he’s been a regular guest there since taking office, having travelled to Beijing five times since September 2008. The frequency of the visits (on average about once every about three months) is likely largely aimed at reassuring Chinese policymakers who preferred dealing with his authoritarian predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. But although ostensibly, the latest trip was over whether China will sell the two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan, the meeting also raises deeper—and in many ways more troubling—questions about the dynamics of Asia’s nuclear proliferation.

China is eager to sell Pakistan additional reactors, having already constructed one 325-Megawatt nuclear power reactor at Chasma (sometimes Chashma), in Pakistan’s Punjab Province, while construction on another should be completed in 2011 or 2012. During a visit by Zardari to Beijing in March 2009, Chinese officials reportedly reaffirmed their commitment to provide two more reactors; this May, two Chinese companies signed a contract to join in construction.

The Chinese government has yet to announce a formal decision to proceed with the transaction. But for several years now, its representatives and Chinese nuclear security experts have claimed that they had agreed to build the two reactors before China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004, making the sale exempt from NSG rules excluding the sale of nuclear technologies to countries like Pakistan that haven’t signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (They’ve offered other public defences of the sale, including that Pakistanis desperately need more electricity).

Such protestations haven’t stopped the US, UK and Indian governments from objecting to the sale and disputing Chinese assertions that ‘grandfathering’ exempts any nuclear deals agreed to before a country enters the NSG. But their efforts at pressing Chinese representatives attending the annual NSG plenary meeting in Christchurch late last month didn’t bear any fruit.

US State Department Spokesman Philip Crowley, speaking last month, indicated that the United States was potentially troubled by the Chinese plan and said it was ‘looking for more information’ from China on what it’s potentially proposing, and stating the deal would need the agreement of the NSG.

But such concerns have failed to move China, with Chinese officials perhaps calculating that Washington and others ultimately won’t try to expel China from the NSG or retaliate in other ways if the sale occurs because they need Beijing’s assistance on other nuclear non-proliferation issues, including Iran and North Korea.

South Asia :New dimensions..!!

Terrorism, religious extremism and nuclear proliferation have given South Asia a depressing image. But there’s growing room for optimism.


When outsiders think about South Asia, they typically picture a region that’s wracked by violent religious extremism, a place where groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba are active and deadly. Then there’s the image of clandestine nuclear proliferation, personified by A.Q. Khan and his network. And of course there’s the enduring hostility between India and Pakistan. Despite occasional peace initiatives, the region’s nuclear-armed rivals find themselves frequently at loggerheads, not least because of concerns in India that terror attacks launched there have the support or encouragement of Pakistan.
However, while this view of South Asia is still too often reality, there are also some encouraging signs of change, a shift being led by India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives.
Sri Lanka has made rapid progress since the end of the Tamil insurgency. It has signed a free trade agreement with India, and Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral trade is booming. Indian investment firms and multinationals, meanwhile, have played a crucial role in Sri Lanka’s economic growth. It’s true that although the civil war is over, Tamil political demands haven’t yet been resolved. Still, the country’s strong economic performance is cause for genuine hope.
Even more encouraging for the region, though, has been the progress in relations between India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh had been threatening to emerge as a major trouble spot during the rule of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led regime, which included Islamist parties bent upon boosting religious extremism in the country. Indeed, the sudden upsurge in extremism had even led some to speculate that Bangladesh could become the next Afghanistan.
But successive Bangladeshi governments have chosen not to tread this path. First, the caretaker government led by Fakharuddin Ahmed moved to try to rein in extremism. Then, Sheikh Hasina and her administration, after being ushered into office with an overwhelming majority, took up the fight against extremism with vigour. For example, her government established a war crimes trial for parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, which committed atrocities against the local population during the Liberation War of Bangladesh. It also took down several cells of Pakistani terror groups operating in Bangladesh. In addition, action was taken against the local Islamist group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. As a result of the clampdown on anti-India terror groups, India-Bangladesh relations improved significantly, especially after Bangladesh handed over several insurgent group leaders to India who had been hiding in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency in India’s north-east.
Such cooperation hasn’t gone unnoticed in India, and bilateral ties reached a new high when Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. Since then, both sides have taken steps to improve ties further, and they are working to resolve several outstanding issues, such as disputes over land boundaries, sharing of common river waters and addressing the trade deficit, which is currently unfavourable to Bangladesh.
Importantly, there has also been some understanding reached on the issue of transit. India has long been demanding transit through Bangladesh to its landlocked north-east, something it had actually had until 1965. Bangladeshi regimes since then have denied India this right, but Bangladesh now plans to involve Bhutan and Nepal in the transit issue. For example, it has allowed both Nepal and Bhutan, which are landlocked, to use Chittagong and Mongla Port. Bhutanese vehicles will use Indian territory to reach Bangladesh, and an agreement to this effect was signed during Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna’s recent visit to Bangladesh. While there, he also signed an agreement on the protection of Indian investments in Bangladesh. Indian multi-nationals plan to invest $3.5 billion in Bangladesh in the near future, which is likely to further boost Bangladesh’s economic growth. Further, unilateral, trade concessions are also likely when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Bangladesh later this year.
All this mark a new beginning for a significant part of South Asia. Pakistan and Afghanistan may still continue to be embroiled in religious and ethnic conflict, but the rest of the region appears keen and ready to move beyond such strife by prioritising economic growth and regional integration. Perhaps sometime soon, this characteristic of regional cooperation can also become a model for those parts of South Asia where peace and stability have for too long proven elusive
.

India and Africa's affairs....!!

Introduction

India and Africa have a relationship that can be traced back to ancient times.
Contacts and trade between the people of the eastern seaboard of Africa and the
western seaboard of India have been going on for centuries. However, the relationship
has swung from a period of great emotional and political solidarity in the 1950s and
1960s to selective engagement in the 1970s and 1980s. In the post-Cold War era in
Africa there is a growing perception that it was marginalised, both politically and
economically. Politically, Africans felt relieved  that Super Power domination in the
continent had ended. On the other hand there is a feeling that they are of little strategic
importance to the major powers. Economically Africa is of little importance to the
major players in the world economy—the Western economies, the multinational
corporations and the banking institutions.This perception was painted mainly by
 Afro pessimists, who felt “if Africa is pushed off the world’s surface, none or only
 few would miss it.”

 It was pushed by hard facts that around 300 million Africans live on US $ 0.65 or less per day, more
than 250 of every 1,000 children die before the age of five and in more than 20
countries one in ten adults has HIV/AIDS.Nevertheless, on the positive side, the continent has witnessed a trend towards democratisation that is visible in multi-party elections across the continent and the
emergence of a democratic South Africa. It is also visible in the launch of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through the joint efforts of South
Africa and Senegal. This action plan promises to remove the tag of the ‘Hopeless
Continent’.

Against this backdrop the paper examines India’s Africa policy in the post-Cold
War era. The cornerstone of India’s Africa policy in the past has been the support for
the struggles against colonialism and racialism in Africa. The emergence of a
democratic South Africa has brought an end to the apartheid struggle in Africa. In
this changed situation what is the focus of India’s Africa policy? This is the main
question that will be addressed in this paper. The term ‘Africa’ refers to the countries
of Sub-Saharan Africa. Since there are close to fifty countries in Africa, an analysis
of bilateral relations is not undertaken.

Historical Background

Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister laid the foundation for India’s
Africa policy. The importance of Africa, he felt, arose from the fact that “though
separated by the Indian Ocean from us, it is in a sense our next door neighbour.”

There were two major strands of his policy towards Africa. The first was the support
for the struggle against colonisation and racial discrimination in South Africa. On
these issues India was very active at the United Nations. The second was related to
the people of Indian origin settled in Africa. He advised the Indians to identify
themselves with the local community, adopt a more positive attitude towards the
political aspirations of the people of their adopted countries. In economic matters, he
advised them not to seek any special privileges at the cost of equal opportunities for
the Africans.

 The Africans acknowledged both Nehru’s and Mahatma Gandhi’s
support for the African struggle. Mazrui, says that Gandhi’s message of non-violence
and passive resistance inspired many black leaders in Africa including Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
Similarly, as the Cold War began, Nehru’s principle of non-alignment appealed to
the Africans.

However, towards the end of Nehru’s tenure, India’s Africa relation dipped to a
low. Few African nations gave diplomatic support to India bilaterally or at multilateral
fora like the Non-aligned Movement (NAM).

 This was due to  a number of factors.

India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war in 1962 caused a setback to the image of India
as a leader. Second, India’s hesitation in fixing a date for the end of colonialism (on
the logic that it was unrealistic) in Africa at the Belgrade NAM Summit in 1961
made it look soft towards the colonial powers. Third, its insistence on African liberation
movements to adopt peaceful means as opposed to China’s overt gestures towards
arms assistance was not appreciated. Fourth, immediately after the 1962 war, India
was busy countering  China at every multilateral forum.

However, by the mid-1960s India undertook a serious reassessment of its Africa
policy and adopted some fresh initiatives. Indira Gandhi’s African Safari in 1964
was aimed at measuring the depth of African solidarity with India. Subsequently,
India stopped treating African countries as a bloc and became selective in its friendship.
It also launched a policy of economic diplomacy. This was flagged off by the launch
of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme in 1964,
primarily to counter China’s aid diplomacy. By the 1970s, India’s stature had risen
in African eyes; the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), the 1971 war, the Green Revolution,
and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 probably contributed towards
this change. Emphasis on economic diplomacy increased in the early 1970s in tandem
with the realisation among developing countries in Asia and Africa of the need for
economic cooperation among themselves. Adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action by
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1980 underlined the importance given
by the Africans to regional and South-South cooperation. The impact of these
initiatives was an increase in India’s trade with Africa, with the balance of trade
favouring India.

In the 1970s and 1980s India continued to support liberation struggles in Africa.
It worked closely with the Africans in the fight against apartheid in South Africa and
Namibia; not just at the UN but also at other multilateral fora such as NAM, and the
Commonwealth. India had accorded diplomatic status to the African National
Congress (ANC) in 1967 and SWAPO (South West African People’s Organisation)
in 1985.

 Apart from diplomatic support, India also provided financial and material
aid to the liberation struggles in Africa, not directly but through multilateral institutions
like the OAU, The UN Fund for Namibia, UN Educational and Training Programme
for South Africa and finally through the Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism
and Apartheid (AFRICA) Fund. The AFRICA Fund was established by NAM under
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership in 1986 to assist frontline states and
liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. According to one estimate India
provided Rs 36 million by 1977-78 while India’s initial contribution to the AFRICA
Fund was Rs 500 million  which included private and individual contributions of Rs
25 million.

As far as India’s policy towards people of Indian origin (PIO) is concerned,
Mrs. Indira Gandhi initially advanced a policy of engagement. During her African
Safari she called them Ambassadors of India. The African states resented the change

in India’s policy towards the PIOs. When Kenya and Uganda launched the policy of
Africanisation and asked Indians to leave the country, Government of India’s sympathy
and concern towards the PIOs was resented.

 These developments had an impact atthree levels. First, is realisation of the fact that the Indian government’s support to the African liberation movements was not reciprocated by the Africans in giving
protection to the people of Indian origin.

Second, the Government of India revertedback to the policy of disengagement with the PIOs. Subsequent governments till thelate 1990s continued this policy. Third, the Government of India’s hesitation in
welcoming the expelled Indians back into its fold, in turn, made them realise the
limits of the policy towards them and the fact that they had been left to their own fate
in their adopted countries.


Recent Policy:

In the post-Cold War era, granted that Indians and Africans were allies in the
struggle against colonialism and apartheid, both now need to march together to the
tune of geo-economics. Based on historic friendship, we can still be partners in the
struggle against under-development, poverty and other common problems.
India’s Africa policy in the post-Cold War era, it appears, is composed of five
mantras:
• Promoting economic cooperation
• Engaging the PIOs
• Preventing and combating terrorism
• Preserving peace
• Assisting the African defence forces
These are discussed below.
Promoting Economic Cooperation
In the early 1990s the government stressed that, “ ... in the future, new relationships
based on concrete economic, technological and educational cooperation will assume
enhanced significance.”

 It needs to be pointed out though that India’s objectives
with regard to this policy have remained the same over the years, i.e., “creation and
consolidation of strong economic bonds among countries of the South and the use of
India’s relative economic strength for development of these countries on mutually
beneficial basis.”

India engaged Africa economically :


Technical Assistance

India has extended technical assistance to African countries under the Indian
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and the Special
Commonwealth  Africa  Assistance Plan (SCAAP). This involves the following
aspects: -
• Training (civil and military)
• Projects and project-related assistance such as supply of equipment,
consultancy services and feasibility studies
• Deputation of experts
• Study visits of senior officials/decision makers to India.
The programme covers various fields.

 The fastest growing segment of ITEC is consultancy and project assistance. This involves preparation of feasibility studies,project reports, setting up pilot projects and research centres in the agricultural sector,
etc. A number of African countries have received assistance in this area.
Over the past four decades, India has provided more than US $2 billion in technical
assistance to the countries of the South and most of it has gone to Africa.

In the 1990s, a number of projects were initiated with Indian help. An Entrepreneurial
Training and Demonstration Centre (ETDC) costing US $ 4.49 million has been
constructed in Dakar (Senegal) by Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) and handed
over in June 2000.

 In Namibia, India has assisted in setting up a Plastic Technology
Demonstration Centre.

In 1994, the government launched a programme for
cooperation with select African countries for the development of small-scale industries
(SSI). These countries were Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya,
Ghana and Ethiopia. The government offered finance for implementation of these
programmes under ITEC. A small-scale industry development project is also under
execution in Zimbabwe. An important training-cum-demonstration project entitled
Indian Farmers Project is to be set up in Burkina Faso.

 In Senegal, Indian officials have been involved in providing feasibility studies for a dairy development project
and an incense stick project.

 Feasibility studies for establishment of a poultry vaccine
laboratory in Mali and for improvements in the education system in South Africa
were also conducted.

Since 1964, India has also provided civil training to over 14,500 trainees from
various countries, mainly from Africa, under the ITEC programme.The countries
were Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South
Africa


Trade

In the last decade a number of initiatives were launched to promote trade with
Africa. Apart from the government, the private sector also pitched in to explore the
African markets.
From the mid-1990s, organisations like the Confederation of Indian Industries
(CII), The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Federation
of Indian Exporters’ Organisation (FIEO) identified Africa as a thrust area and
launched programmes to promote economic and business cooperation. This included
exchange of information, conducting one-to-one business meetings and organising
activities like ‘Made in India’ shows across Africa. These chambers have also entered
into joint business agreements with Mauritius, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia.

The Government Initiatives are:

• US $6 million EXIM line of Credit to PTA countries: In September 1992,
the EXIM Bank signed an agreement with the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
Bank to extend an US $ 6 million line of credit to members of the PTA only
for import of capital goods from India. The PTA covered 21 countries from
Eastern and Southern Africa.

 In 1994 the PTA was replaced with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

• Engaging West African Countries: In an effort to strengthen political and
economic ties with West African countries, the then Prime Minister, P.V.
Narasimha Rao visited Burkina Faso and Ghana in November 1995.
• R e v o l v i n g   F u n d   f o r  A f r i c a :   I n   1 9 9 6 ,   P r i m e   M i n i s t e r,   H . D .
Deve Gowda announced at the G-15 Summit in Harare the creation of a
revolving fund of Rs. 100 crores towards regional cooperation with  Africa.

• MoU with SADC: A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between
India and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was signed
in October 1997 which envisaged both government and private sector
cooperation in the region, similar to the one followed by COMESA and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
• Meeting of HoMs/Commercial Representatives: Meeting of Heads of
Missions (HoMs) / commercial representatives of Indian missions in Eastern
and Southern Africa under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State for
Commerce Industry was held in June 2000. A similar meeting was convened
in October 2000 in West Africa


• Focus Africa: The Focus Africa programme was launched as part of the
EXIM Policy 2002-2003. Encouraged by the Focus initative in Latin
America, the government launched a Focus Africa initiative. Selected Indian
missions will provide business promotion services to visiting Indian exporters/
businessmen at a nominal fee by setting up business centres. The first phase
of Focus Africa will focus on  Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius,
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Ghana. Firms exporting to these markets will be
given ‘Export House’ status subject to a mininum export of Rs 5 crore


Overall, the trade between India and Sub-Saharan Africa has grown from US$
893 million in 1991-92 to US$ 3,390 million in 2000-2001, registering as increase
of more than 280 per cent in 9 years


Mahatma Gandhi had said, “The commerce between India and Africa will be of
ideas and services, not of manufactured goods against raw materials after the fashion
of western exploiters.”

But the laws of the marketplace appear to be inexorable!
Most of our imports from Africa consist of minerals, petroleum products and raw
materials, while our exports are textiles, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, etc.
(See Fig. 2) The composition of Africa’s trade has caused some anxiety among some
Africans too. Adebayo Adedji, former Executive Secretary of the Economic


Commission of Africa (ECA) states that, “The traditional scenario that obtained in
our trade with the developed world, whereby our country supplies the former with
commodities and imports there from manufactured products including capital goods,
is being reproduced, deliberately or not, in our intra-third world trade … I feel…such
a situation is completely unacceptable to us.

This is a reality that the Africans have to face and the composition of trade would be changed only with greater level
of economic development in these countries.


Future of Exports

Despite the number of initiatives launched by the Indian government, Indian
exports are still a miniscule part of total African imports . The Indian
Commerce Minister feels that Indian exports to Africa are sub-optimal. The problems
of trading with Africa are wellknown—large payments to Indian exporters being
stuck due to foreign exchange crunch; language problem; lack of awareness about
the African potential, ongoing conflicts; and lack of direct shipping lines to Africa.
In today’s market-driven economics, the government’s role is limited; it can act as a
facilitator  alone. The competition in trading with Africa is indeed hotting up.

Advent of AGOA

The good news is that Indian textile exporters need to take advantage of the
opportunity to export goods to the US without restrictions, through the African Growth
and Opportunities Act (AGOA), signed in 2000. Thirty-five countries in Africa are
eligible for AGOA, but only 17 have qualified for exporting to the US through
AGOA.Countries like China and Malaysia have got excited with AGOA and plan to
increase investments in Africa. Malaysia has already invested in a textile unit in
South Africa in 2002.
Pharma Success
In April 2001, the South African government won the case against multinationals
to import generic AIDS drugs.

 This landmark judgement has opened the gates for
pharmaceutical exports from India of generic AIDS drugs to Africa. Around 20
million people living in Africa are infected with the AIDS virus.

 These anti-retroviral drugs, or ARVs, could be supplied by the Indian companies at a fraction of the cost
of Western drugs. Nigeria was the first country to import these from Cipla and
Ranbaxy. India has seven pharmaceutical companies manufacturing ARVs. A fourday Africa-India Health Summit organised by the Government of India brought
together 16 African countries.
Leading pharma companies showcased their
capabilities and products. At the end of the Summit the ground was laid for joint
ventures in African countries. South Africa and Kenya  have signed agreements for
joint ventures with Indian firms.

Cashing the Information Boom:

India has made a name in Information Technology and there is good scope for IT
exports to Africa. Only half a million Africans have access to the Internet, and therefore
there is a pressing need to narrow the ‘digital divide’.

  The Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) has launched an initiative to accelerate the adoption of information
systems in Africa. There is tremendous scope for joint ventures with India in this
field.

NEPAD
This new initiative undertakes to promote and protect democracy and human
rights in exchange for sustained levels of aid, investment and economic engagement
with the developed world. A summit with the investors was organised in
Dakar in April 2002. Subsequently, the Africans have engaged the G8 countries, the
European Union and India. The G8 countries have pledged support to NEPAD and
launched an African Action Plan at the G8 Summit in June 2002.

 Among the G8 countries, Japan has been actively supporting the cause of African development. In
1993 the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
was held. This was followed by TICAD II in 1998 while TICAD III is scheduled to
be held in September 2003.

 African development issues are on the agenda of the
second EU-Africa Summit to be held sometime in the near future.
 The Indian government also appears to consider NEPAD as a viable action plan,
and a conference was organised in July 2002 with 30 representatives from industry and the
finance sector of a number of African countries.

Engaging the PIOs
The government of India has tried to engage people of Indian origin (PIO) in the
post-Cold War era. While the Congress government’s approach was cautious, the
BJP government has turned the policy around. The PIOs are now the focus of the
government’s foreign policy initiatives in different regions of the world. It organised
the first-ever meet of parliamentarians of Indian origin at New Delhi in December
1998.

 It also offered a PIO Card. However, at US$ 1,000 there were very few
takers. The Global Organisation for People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) called for a
reduction to US$ 250.
In September 2000,  the government set up a high-level committee on the Indian
diaspora as a major initiative.
 The mandate of the committee was to make a
comprehensive study of the global Indian diaspora and to recommend measures for
a constructive relationship. The report was submitted on January 8, 2002. Some of
the prominent recommendations are:
• Offer of Dual citizenship to PIO/NRIs living in select countries (United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Western
Europe, Singapore) under the rubric of the Citizenship Act
• Fee reduction in PIO Card scheme
• Celebration of ‘Pravasi Bhartiya Divas’ on January 9 (the day Mahatma
Gandhi returned from South Africa) every year
• Setting up of a ‘single window’ organisation, a Pravasi Bhartiya Bhawan, to
deal with the PIO/NRI issues.
The government has accepted most of these recommendations. In keeping with
the suggestions, the government organised three-day long celebrations commemorating
the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas in January 2003. A number of conferences were held
involving professionals, intellectuals, businessmen and parliamentarians of Indian
origin.

The recommendations of the high-level committee has led to a debate and one
view is that they seem to benefit the NRI/PIOs in Europe and America more than

those in Africa. Organisations like GOPIO have welcomed the dual citizenship move.
In fact, they have been demanding it for a long time.

 It seems to have created three categories of PIO’s—one, people who live either
 in Europe or North America whocan claim dual citizenship; two, those who have
Indian nationality only (e.g., thosein the Gulf); and three, people who only have
 the citizenship of the countries of residence (e.g. Africa and the Caribbean).
 It has led to disappointment amongstpeople of Indian origin in Africa who
feel the Government of India has been discriminatory.

 Some argue that PIOs in Eastern Africa may not be interested in
dual citizenship.

 In the past the people of Indian origin in East Africa suffered due
to the fluctuating policies of the Government of India. After independence, these
PIOs had assumed that the Government of India would come to their rescue when
they were in trouble. However, India overlooked them in its bid to cultivate relations
with the Africans. Indeed, very few Indians took up the Indian government’s offer of
resettlement in India when they were asked to leave Uganda and Kenya.
Preventing and Combating Terrorism
The September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated the destructive power of
terrorists. India strongly condemned these attacks as did the African countries. Africa
came to the limelight when the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were attacked
in August 1998. Terrorism struck Africa again in November 2002 when a terrorist
bomb exploded at a hotel complex in the coastal town of Mombassa.

 About twelve people lost their lives in the attack. Almost simultaneously, a chartered plane of
Israel’s Arkia Airlines narrowly missed a missile attack while taking off from
Mombassa Airport.

It is estimated that there are more than a dozen countries in Africa, where terrorist
groups (mainly as part of the Al Qaida network) have established a strong presence.

Sudan and Somalia figure prominently in that list. Sudan was declared a rogue state
by the US because it provided a safe haven to a number of terrorist organisations,
including the Al Qaida. Osama bin Laden was quite active in Sudan from 1991-96.
Nevertheless, the Sudanese and the Somalian governments joined other African
countries in condemning the terrorist attacks against the US. About 25 Africans
from 13 different African countries had lost their lives in these attacks.
In the war against terrorism, most of the African countries have pledged nonmilitary support to the United States government. Kenya and Djibouti offered access
to sea and airport facilities to the US military, though in Kenya the opposition parties
asked the government to give an explanation on this issue in the parliament.

South Africa had offered non-military support, including intelligence sharing.


The September 11 attacks and the subsequent attacks on the Indian parliament
on December 13, 2001 have led to a greater understanding of the Indian position on
terrorism by the Africans. The African countries supported in the past India’s moves
to deter terrorism, at multilateral fora. At the Durban NAM Summit in September
1998, the African countries including South Africa supported the Indian proposal
for international action against terrorism. Last year, in October, Senegal hosted a
conference on terrorism that was attended by heads of states of 27 African countries.
This meeting enabled the African states to take a common stand against terrorism. It
also sought to devise an African anti-terrorism accord that would allow extradition
of terrorists from one state to another. Such a crucial provision was missing in the
earlier OAU Convention on Terrorism (1999).
Promoting Peace.
Peace is an elusive commodity in Africa which has witnessed scores of conflicts
over the years. It is estimated that 18 Sub-Saharan African countries are directly or
indirectly involved in conflicts; in 12 others, conflict can erupt at any moment.

In a number of these conflicts, the Blue Helmets were deployed. India has participated in
a number of these peacekeeping operations. It was involved in the United Nations
operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); Somalia (UNOSOM I, II); United Nations
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I, II, III) and Observer Mission (MONUA);
and also in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNAMEE).

India’s role in UN peacekeeping in Africa has been much appreciated by the
local population. In a conference in New Delhi, the Namibian Foreign Minister was
quick to express appreciation of India response to the African hour of need.

Nevertheless, it has also got its share of brickbats. In Sierra Leone Major-General
V.K. Jetley got caught in controversy, with the Nigerian and other governments of
the West African coalition which demanded his removal.

 General Jetley had accused senior African military commanders of the UN peacekeeping force of colluding with
the rebels to mine diamonds illegally. The West African nations perceived the presence
of Indian UN peacekeeping forces  in Sierra Leone as ‘interference’.

Assisting the African Defence Forces
India has been providing military training to officers and JCOs of the African
defence forces. Most of the African countries lack military training institutions and,
therefore, the officers are often sent abroad either to the military colleges of the
former colonial powers or friendly countries in the developing world. Since the 1960s
India has provided military training to a number of Africans, primarily from
Anglophone Africa. Training is imparted in national institutions under the three wings
of the defence services, including the National Defence College New Delhi and the
Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. The training covers fields such as security
and strategic studies, defence management, artillery, electronics, mechanical, marine
and aeronautical engineering, anti-marine warfare, logistics management and
qualitative assurance services.

 During the period 1990-91 to 2000-2001, around
800 officers and JCOs from 12 African countries (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Madagascar, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania
and Uganda) were provided training by the Indian Army under ITEC.

 India has also sent training teams to various African countries like Botswana, Zambia and
Lesotho. As part of its cooperation in defence, India has supplied a small quantity of
conventional arms to the Africans.
India has supplied patrol crafts (SDB Mk-2 type) to Mauritius and Guinea Bissau
(one each) in 1993, and light helicopters (SA-316 B Aloutte-3 and SA-315B Lama)
to Namibia (two each) in 1994.India has also imported weapons from South Africa.

Conclusion

India’s Africa policy indicates both change and continuity in the post-Cold War
era. The people of Africa have acknowledged India’s support in the past and there is
a lot of goodwill towards India. They are attracted towards the new image of India in
the 21st  century as the new centre for technology and commerce in Asia.
India should reciprocate and follow the EU and the Japanese examples for
cooperation to mutual benefit. Economically, this partnership with Africa would